A NEW PARADIGM FOR INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SOFTWARE
MARK H. WEBBINK1

ABSTRACT
A Winter 2004 article by Bradford L. Smith and Susan O.
Mann of Microsoft published in The University of Chicago Law
Review suggests that the development and growth of the software
industry in the U.S. is a direct outgrowth of the implementation of
intellectual property regimes, specifically copyright and patent,
with respect to software in the late 1970s and early 1980s. This
paper suggests that such patents were neither the sole nor the
principal factor for the development of the software industry, that
concerns about patents manifested prior to or soon after their
application to software have proven true, and that patents are, in
fact, not serving the interests of either the U.S. software industry or
the consuming public. To that end, this paper advances
recommendations for reforming the U.S. patent system as well as
consideration of a new schema for protecting software.
He who receives an idea from me receives instruction himself without
lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at mine, receives light
without darkening me.
- Thomas Jefferson (1813)

THE SMITH-MANN ARTICLE
¶1
Bradford Smith, Microsoft’s General Counsel, and Susan Mann,
also of Microsoft, wrote an article published in 2004 entitled Innovation and
1
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Intellectual Property Protection in the Software Industry: An Emerging
Role for Patents2 that discusses the role of intellectual property in the
growth of the software industry over the past 25 years. Yet the article
totally ignores all of the other factors that contributed to and, more
importantly, invited the growth of a standalone commercial software
industry. Specifically, the article makes no mention of the development of
the personal computer and its role in triggering the demand for off-the-shelf
software. Not only did patents not cause the launch and rapid growth of the
mass market software industry, they have played no significant role in
causing that industry to grow as most software patents have been issued
long since the industry was established. As seen in Table 1,3 the escalation
of patent filings by Microsoft did not occur until 1994, long after the
company had become well established and was being investigated for its
monopolistic practices. In fact, contrary to what Smith and Mann suggest,
today software patents are widely recognized as a threat to the freedom to
innovate within the software industry.

EARLY CONCERNS ABOUT SOFTWARE PATENTS
¶2
Long before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office began
recognizing software patents in 1983, the National Commission on New
Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU), a commission
chartered by Congress in 1975 to study, among other things, copyrights and
computer software, concluded: “Even if patents prove available in the
United States, only the very few programs which survive the rigorous
application and appeals procedure could be patented.”4
¶3
Even Bill Gates recognized that software patents may prove to be
problematic when, in 1991, he stated in a memorandum:

“If people had understood how patents would be granted when most of
today's ideas were invented, and had taken out patents, the industry
would be at a complete standstill today. . . . I feel certain that some
large company will patent some obvious thing related to interface,

2

Bradford L. Smith and Susan O. Mann, Innovation and Intellectual Property
Protection in the Software Industry: An Emerging Role for Patents, 71 U. CHI.
L. REV. 241 (2004).
3
Table 1 is available at the end of this iBrief.
4
FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGY USES OF
COPYRIGHTED WORKS (July 31, 1978), available at http://digital-lawonline.info/CONTU/PDF/index.html [hereinafter “CONTU”].
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object orientation, algorithm, application extension or other crucial
technique.”5
¶4
Think of it for a second. Had software patents been around since
1975, the following inventions would have been subject to patents for the
better part of the last 20 years: (a) WordStar, the first PC-based word
processor released in 1979; (b) VisiCalc, the first PC-based spreadsheet
program released in 1979; and (c) Harvard Graphics, the first PC-based
presentation graphics program released in 1983. Where would we be today
had we been locked into only those choices? Needless to say, Microsoft
Office would not be ubiquitous. Interestingly, Dan Bricklin, one of the
inventors of VisiCalc, regularly writes and speaks today about the problem
with software patents.6 In 1991, when Bill Gates made his remarks,
Microsoft had fewer than 50 filed patent applications; today Microsoft has
over 4,000 issued patents and more than 10,000 pending patent
applications.7

TRIVIAL SOFTWARE PATENTS
¶5
CONTU's speculation that “only the very few programs which
survive the rigorous application and appeals procedure could be patented”
has proven far from correct.8 Compare the number of patents that have
been filed in two key areas in the last 22 years, pharmaceuticals and
software.
If one examines the principal patent class in which
pharmaceutical patents are registered (U.S. class 514), one finds that in a
22-year stretch almost 80,000 pharmaceutical patents have been issued.9
These pharmaceutical patents account for the billions of dollars of income
and thousands, if not tens of thousands, of drugs that have come to market
during that time. However, during that same period, the software industry,
which has been equally as strong financially throughout that period, has
acquired more than 150,000 patents10 on various forms of software or, more
5

Bill Gates, Challenges and Strategy, (May 16, 1991), available at
http://discuss.sarahsbookstores.com/Bill_Gates_Challenges_And_Strategy_Me
mo.
6
Dan Bricklin, Patents and Software, at
http://www.bricklin.com/patentsandsoftware.htm (last viewed October 8, 2004).
7
As identified by searching Microsoft, as assignee, against the U.S. Patent and
Trademark database utilizing the patent and patent application advanced search
functions found at http://www.uspto.gov/patft/index.html.
8
CONTU supra note 4.
9
As identified by searching the Current U.S. Classification for Class 514 against
the U.S. Patent and Trademark database utilizing the patent and patent
application advanced search functions found at
http://www.uspto.gov/patft/index.html.
10
Based on all patents issued in classes 345, 700-707 and 715-717, which cover
the bulk of software patents, as identified by searching the Current U.S.
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specifically, software features, even though pharmaceuticals had a
significant head start; more than 75% of those software patents have a filing
date of 1994 or after.
That is not a complete picture because many of those
pharmaceutical patents cover the same drugs. A further comparison is
worthwhile. Compare the number of pharmaceutical patents required to
protect a couple of blockbuster drugs to the number of patents obtained by
one company on one selected software feature—the positioning and/or
movement of a cursor. Pfizer's blockbuster, multi-billion dollar Viagra is
covered by just one patent.11 Similarly, just one patent covered Merck's
blockbuster, multi-billion dollar Zocor.12 By comparison, Microsoft has 14
separate patents on the positioning and movement of a cursor,13 and they
have two additional applications pending on it.14 Rather than producing
broad innovations to advance the software industry, like the earliermentioned inventions such as the word processor, spreadsheet, or
presentation graphics, information is being sliced and diced to the point that
every trivial combination or extension of prior software technology is being
accorded the same protection as a groundbreaking drug. In the summer of
2004, when Bill Gates announced that Microsoft would be increasing its
annual patent filings from 2,000 to 3,000 per year, it was notable that there
was no corresponding 50% increase in Microsoft spending for research and
development. In fact, contrary to the strong correlation shown in Table 1
among Microsoft’s revenue, R&D spending, and patent applications filed
between 1994 and 1999, the rate of increase in Microsoft patent filings will
now outstrip growth in revenue or R&D. In other words, the block of
cheese is the same size; the slices are simply thinner.
¶6

¶7
It should be evident that this system of protecting software is not
the root cause of innovation in the software industry. Microsoft is a prime

Classification for these classes against the U.S. Patent and Trademark database
utilizing the patent and patent application advanced search functions found at
http://www.uspto.gov/patft/index.html.
11
As identified by searching the term “Viagra” utilizing the search tool found at
http://www.fda.gov/cder/ob/docs/querytn.htm.
12
As identified by searching the term “Zocor” utilizing the search tool found at
http://www.fda.gov/cder/ob/docs/querytn.htm.
13
As identified by searching Microsoft as assignee and the term “cursor” in the
title of issued patents against the U.S. Patent and Trademark database utilizing
the patent advanced search functions found at
http://www.uspto.gov/patft/index.html.
14
As identified by searching Microsoft as assignee and the term “cursor” in the
title of patent applications against the U.S. Patent and Trademark database
utilizing the patent application advanced search functions found at
http://www.uspto.gov/patft/index.html.
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example of patents significantly trailing, rather than leading, innovation and
fiscal success. Patents having played no meaningful role in the first 10
years of Microsoft’s life as a public corporation. Contrast this with the
pharmaceutical industry. A competitor for one of those major drugs only
had to identify three patents to ascertain whether they were infringing and
only had to work around those three patents if they chose to compete. By
contrast, the software industry is producing thousands upon thousands of
inherently meaningless software patents of dubious value, each a potential
threat to innovation and competition. And, whereas each of Pfizer and
Merck undoubtedly spent hundreds of millions of dollars in bringing Viagra
and Zocor to market, the cost of filing and prosecuting the average software
patent far outweighs any economic value such patent will produce, or the
cost of producing the so-called invention. One has to speculate whether the
sole purpose of such increases in patent filings is simply to substitute a legal
monopoly for an illegal one.

INVALID SOFTWARE PATENTS
¶8
It is bad enough that software patents are being filed at an
astounding rate for such trivial matters, but the lack of scrutiny such patents
receive, is telling as well. Software patents are not the only class of patents
that are vulnerable to reexamination and invalidation; patents of all classes
are highly vulnerable to such assertions. In their report entitled Empirical
Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, John R. Allison and Mark A.
Lemley of the University of Texas examine patent validity opinions from an
8-year period through 1996.15 They found that fully 46% of all patents
litigated were invalidated.16 When only software patents were considered, a
third were invalidated.17 This comes as no surprise to anyone who has spent
time reviewing software patents. The lack of an established and easily
accessible body of prior art, reduced standards of non-obviousness, and
pressure on the USPTO examiners to meet prosecution performance
statistics have all contributed to this condition.

SOFTWARE PATENTS – INNOVATION OR A BARRIER TO ENTRY?
¶9
The problems presented by software patents and their negative
impact on innovation have not gone unnoticed. As pointed out in their
paper entitled The Software Patent Experiment, James Bessen and Robert
Hunt argue that there is reasonable evidence to show that software patents

15

John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of
Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205-206 (1998), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=118149.
16
Id. at 16.
17
Id. at 17.
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are not inducing innovation.18 They found that established firms obtain
most software patents and to a greater degree than established firms in other
industries. Interestingly, they also found a negative correlation between
increases in a firms' software patent focus and their R&D intensity,
suggesting that such established firms are substituting software patents for
R&D. This is born out further by Bessen and Hunt in their finding that:
“[Where companies are assembling large portfolios of software
patents, such] firms may compete to tax each others' inventions and in
the process reduce their competitors' incentive to engage in R&D. The
outcome of patent litigation and licensing agreements often depends
on the size of the firm's patent portfolio. This creates an incentive to
build larger patent portfolios, especially when the firm focuses on
patents as a competitive strategy. In this account, firms choose to
compete in court, rather than in the marketplace.”19
¶10

They go on to hypothesize:
“During the early 1980s, patents were relatively costly to obtain, and
this might have discouraged substitution away from R&D and toward
strategic patenting. By the mid 1990s, software patents became a
relatively inexpensive way to expand patent portfolios. This may have
increased the attractiveness of a strategy that emphasizes patent rights
over a strategy based on R&D. Such a change in strategy would be
particularly attractive to mature firms if their R&D labs are not as
productive as they once were.”20

¶11
In a 2004 research report prepared by Deutsche Bank Research, the
authors discuss the issue of Germany's lag in introducing technology
innovation.21 While the report calls for properly valuing intellectual
property as one step in increasing innovation, it also calls for “a balanced IP
protection regime to foster the creation and flow of ideas,” going on to state
that “stronger IP protection is not always better. Chances are that patents on
software, common practice in the US and on the brink of being legalised in
Europe, in fact stifle innovation. Europe could still alter course.”22 Citing

18

JAMES BESSEN & ROBERT M. HUNT, THE SOFTWARE PATENT EXPERIMENT, 2
(Research on Innovation Working Paper, 2004), available at
http://www.researchoninnovation.org/softpat.pdf.
19
Id. at 14-15.
20
Id. at 15.
21
DEUTSCHE BANK RESEARCH, INNOVATION IN GERMANY: WINDOWS OF
OPPORTUNITY, (June 22, 2004), available at
http://www.dbresearch.com/servlet/reweb2.ReWEB?rwkey=u435967&%24rwfr
ame=0.
22
Id.
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the findings and suggestions of a study by James Bessen and Eric Maskin.23
Deutsche Bank recommends favoring copyright protection over patent
protection for software as a means of maintaining a more level playing field
and attracting and inviting innovation from the sector that historically has
produced it—the small- and medium-sized enterprise. It is significant that
Europeans are recognizing the flaws in the U.S. system.
¶12
This sentiment is further echoed in the August 2004 report by
PricewaterhouseCoopers for the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs
entitled Rethinking the European ICT Agenda.24 In that report,
PricewaterhouseCoopers states:

“There are particular threats to the European ICT [Information and
Communication Technology] industry such as the current discussion
on the patent on software. The mild regime of IP protection in the past
has led to a very innovative and competitive software industry with
low entry barriers. A software patent, which serves to protect
inventions of a non-technical nature, could kill the high innovation
rate.”25

In another empirical study reported by Petra Moser of MIT in the
2003 paper entitled How Do Patent Laws Influence Innovation? Evidence
From Nineteenth-Century World Fairs,26 Moser finds no evidence that
patent laws increased levels of innovative activity. Rather, he reveals
strong evidence that patent systems influenced the distribution of innovative
activity across industries. In fact, evidence presented by Moser
substantiates the contention that countries without patent laws were just as
innovative as those with strong patent protection. Moser’s findings are
further supported in Bronwyn Hall’s 2003 paper, Business Method Patents,
Innovation and Policy.27 Hall reaches two conclusions: “(1) there exists a
unique standard of nonobviousness that maximizes the rate of innovation in
¶13

23

JAMES BESSEN & ERIC MASKIN, SEQUENTIAL INNOVATION, PATENTS, AND
IMITATION (Dept. of Econ., Mass. Inst. of Technology, Working Paper No. 0001, 2000), available at http://www.researchoninnovation.org/patrev.pdf.
24
DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND POST, THE
NETHERLANDS MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, RETHINKING THE EUROPEAN
ICT AGENDA, (Aug. 2004) available at https://www.ictstrategyeu2004.nl/pdf/Rethinking_the_European_ICT_agenda_def.pdf.
25
Id. at 50.
26
PETRA MOSER, HOW DO PATENT LAWS INFLUENCE INNOVATION? EVIDENCE
FROM NINETEENTH-CENTURY WORLD FAIRS, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 9909, 2003), available at
https://www.nber.org/papers/w9909.
27
BRONWYN HALL, BUSINESS METHOD PATENTS, INNOVATION, AND POLICY,
(Econ. Dept., University of California, Berkeley, Working Paper E03-331,
2003), available at http://repositories.cdlib.org/iber/econ/E03-331/.
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a given industry; and (2) contrary to the conventional wisdom, reductions in
the nonobviousness requirement are more likely to encourage innovation in
industries that innovate slowly than in industries that innovate rapidly.”28
She goes on to state: “The implication is that in rapidly innovating
industries where each new product builds on others, welfare is more likely
to be enhanced by having a high hurdle for obtaining a patent.”29 Clearly,
this defines the state of the software industry.

CROSS-LICENSING – THREATENING START-UPS
Problems are not limited to the patenting process and the stifling of
innovation resulting solely there from. Most of these same information
technology companies, who have aggressively pursued thousands of
software patents, have also entered into cross-license agreements with each
other. As feudal lords, they have no interest in internecine fighting among
themselves, so they promise not to sue each other for patent infringement.
Everybody else is left on the outside looking in, including all of the small
start-ups that are, more often than not, the source of true innovation in the
software industry.
¶14

Why are these cross-licenses so valuable to the major players and
why are they threatening to the small and medium businesses? In part it is
the sheer cost of patent litigation. Practitioners in the field of patent
litigation will tell you it is some of the most expensive litigation to which a
party can be exposed. An industry rule of thumb is that any patent
infringement lawsuit will easily cost $1.5 million in legal fees alone to
defend.
¶15

¶16
The licensing of software patents has become an industry unto
itself. IBM took an early lead when it recognized that its vast portfolio of
patents was not producing any direct income. Led by the efforts of
Marshall Phelps, IBM began an aggressive campaign of “suggesting” that
other companies pay for a license to IBM's broad patent portfolio. Such
“suggestions”, while often based on specific patents, often proved
sufficiently intimidating simply by the sheer size of IBM's portfolio. These
efforts paid off for IBM. In the year 2000 alone IBM generated more than
$1.6 billion in intellectual property licensing income.30 IBM has been
roundly criticized for its aggressive licensing practices,31 and now those

28

Id. at 7.
Id. at 8.
30
Elisa Barton, Big Blue’s Big Brother Lab, WIRED NEWS, (Apr. 24, 2001), at
http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,1282,43186,00.html.
31
Gary L. Reback, Patently Absurd, FORBES.COM, (Jun. 24, 2002), at
http://www.forbes.com/asap/2002/0624/044.html.
29
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practices have been adopted by Microsoft with its hiring of IBM's former
head of intellectual property licensing, Marshall Phelps.

SOFTWARE IP – DENYING INNOVATION, DENYING CHOICE
¶17
Today in the U.S. information industry, we are observing the
building of an iron curtain of intellectual property. It is an iron curtain built
with bricks consisting of thousands upon thousands of weak and oftentimes
invalid software patents. It is an iron curtain built with the mortar of crosslicense agreements that protect large patent holders at the expense of the
small start-up. It is an iron curtain built on a foundation of non-disclosure
that runs directly contrary to the purpose set forth in the Constitution for the
granting of copyrights and patents. It is an iron curtain intended to keep
customers walled in and competitors walled out. It is an iron curtain erected
to deny freedom—freedom of choice.
¶18
Some might wonder what is fundamentally wrong with this.
Although a few of these companies have gotten into hot water in the past
over antitrust violations, are they not simply taking advantage of the law?
Many have purportedly established these large patent portfolios for
defensive purposes, solely to protect themselves from the threats of others,
despite the fact that they have eliminated the majority of the greatest threats
through cross-licensing.

The problem, in part, lies in the assumption that patent law, as
presently applied to software, is infallible. The application of patents to
software has only been in place since the early 1980's. Early on, concerns
were expressed that by forcing software into a patent regime we were
shoving the proverbial square peg in a round hole. One must ask whether
such uses, or abuses, are not running afoul of the very foundation of our
patent system, the U.S. Constitution. While granting these limited duration
and scope monopolies, the Constitution clearly recognized there was a
higher purpose to be served, i.e., the advancement of science and the useful
arts. We have now established a patent system for protecting software that
is failing to promote that progress.
¶19

THE IMMEDIATE REMEDY - EUROPE
¶20
There are, however, solutions available, both immediate and longterm, that are applicable in the U.S. and abroad. An early lead is being
taken in Europe as the European Commission and European Parliament
work to establish a uniform system for software patents (more properly,
computer-implemented inventions) across the European Union.32 While the
32

See Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on
the Patentability of Computer-Implemented Inventions, COM(02)92 final,
available at http://www2.europarl.eu.int/oeil/file.jsp?id=219592.
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final result of this legislative process remains uncertain, what is certain are
some of the amendments that are likely to be incorporated into the
legislation. First is the definition of the term “technical contribution” as it is
incorporated into the legislation. A narrow definition of this term, along the
lines of its interpretation to date by the courts of Germany, will eliminate
the vast majority of business method patents and will restore a substantial
non-obviousness test to software patents. The second is the addition of a
statutory protection of the right to create interoperable products. Should
those amendments be adopted, the European legislation will have gone a
long way toward addressing some of the more severe problems inherent in
the U.S. patent system.

THE IMMEDIATE REMEDY – U.S.
¶21
One source of immediate remedies is set forth in the FTC report To
Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition and Patent Law
and Policy,33 in which the FTC recommends the following changes to our
patent system:

33

•

Creation of a new administrative procedure to allow
post-grant review of and opposition to patents;

•

Specify that challenges to the validity of a patent must
only meet the test of a “preponderance of the
evidence” rather than the current standard of “clear
and convincing evidence;”

•

Tightening of the legal standards used to evaluate
whether a patent is “obvious”, placing a greater burden
on the patent holder to show that “commercial
success” is an indicator of non-obviousness as well as
the connection between the claimed invention and
such commercial success, as well as giving greater
credence to whether the invention was suggested to
one of ordinary skill in the art, i.e., the “suggestion”
test;

•

Providing the resources and policies and procedures to
permit greater and more thorough review of patents
and greater disclosure by applicants;

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER
BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY (Oct. 2003),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/10/cpreport.htm.
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•

Giving consideration to possible harm to competition
before extending the scope of patentable subject
matter;

•

Requiring the publication of all patent applications 18
months after filing, not just those that are also subject
to international filings; and

•

A tightening of the standards for willful infringement.
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¶22
Another source for proposed patent reform is the National Academy
of Science (NAS) report A Patent System for the 21st Century.34 In addition
to addressing some of the proposals advanced by the FTC, the NAS
recommends: (a) strengthening the USPTO's capabilities; (b) shielding
some research uses of patented inventions from infringement liability; (c)
limiting the subjective elements of patent litigation; and (d) harmonizing the
U.S., European, and Japanese patent examination systems.

A third source of suggestions is the USPTO report The 21st Century
Strategic Plan.35 While primarily focused on improvements in the
operation of the USPTO, this report acknowledges that statutory and rule
changes are also necessary if the patent system is to meet its essential
purpose.

¶23

¶24
Finally, there is the report from the National Innovation Initiative
(NII) entitled Innovate America – Thriving in a World of Challenge and
Change36 which states that: “A balanced legal regime that both protects the
rewards of intellectual property and facilitates the spread of open standards
is one of the requisites for an American Innovation Century.”
¶25
Among the problems cited in the NII report are the issuance of
inappropriate and poor quality patents, tension between the spread open
standards and traditional IP protection, and the need for limits on
infringement remedies.
¶26
Even Brad Smith, General Counsel of Microsoft, has called for a
number of these reforms, as well as greater harmonization around the world.
This is an area on which Brad and this author agree. Specifically, this
author advocates:

34

A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (Stephen Merrill et al. eds., 2004)
available at http://www.nap.edu/html/patentsystem/.
35
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, THE 21ST CENTURY STRATEGIC PLAN
(Feb. 3, 2003), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/strat21/.
36
NATIONAL INNOVATION INITIATIVE, COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS,
INNOVATE AMERICA – THRIVING IN A WORLD OF CHALLENGE AND CHANGE,
(July 23, 2004), available at
http://www.compete.org/pdf/NII_Interim_Report.pdf.
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•

Non-diversion of PTO fees;

•

Third-party participation in the patent examination
process;

•

Post-grant oppositions;

•

Challenges to the validity of patents to be based on a
“preponderance of the evidence,” not “clear and
convincing evidence” standard;

•

Restoration of the once-strong non-obviousness
standard;

•

A higher threshold in finding willful infringement;

•

A higher threshold before granting injunctive relief;

•

Publication of all patent applications after 18 months;

•

Harmonization with Europe to narrow the scope of
what is patentable in the software and business method
arenas as well as assuring the right to interoperability.
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LOOKING AT THE LONG-TERM
¶27
The patent system in the U.S. today as applied to software is not
inducing innovation; innovation in the software industry occurs despite the
patent system. The system of intellectual property protection for software is
so fundamentally broken that one prominent industry official, Andy Grove,
chairman of Intel, has stated the U.S. “needs to revamp not just the patent
system, but the entire system of intellectual property law.”37
¶28
The recommendations for reforming the patent system are all within
the realm of possible and necessary. At the same time, we should not
assume that, even as modified and improved, the application of patent law
to software is inherently the best or most logical means of protecting the
interests of the developing party. Perhaps we should consider a new
paradigm that is specifically designed for software and incorporates the best
elements of both patents and copyright. Some characteristics of such a
paradigm could include:

•

37

a shorter term of protection (5-7 years would maintain
the speed of innovation);

Jonathan Krim, Patenting Air or Protecting Property?, WASH. POST, Dec. 11,
2003, at E01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wpdyn/A54548-2003Dec10.
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•

protection only for complete systems or features, not
components (avoids the trivial);

•

strong protection (reward first movers);

•

published source code (allows knowledge to advance);
and

•

interoperability.
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¶29
Compared to other forms of art covered by either patent or
copyright, software is still in its infancy. Let us not assume that a regime
that protected other forms of art is suitable to software. Let us not assume
that the Diamond38 and State Street39 courts were correct in permitting the
application of patents to software. It is time to reexamine their conclusions
and determine whether an alternative regime would be more appropriate.
The future of the U.S. software industry may depend on it.

38

Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir.
1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999).

39
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